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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KAREN MARIE JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890175 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Facts, and 
Statement of the Case are set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 
1-5. Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to Point I of 
Appellee's brief. The remaining argument is adequately briefed in 
Appellant's Opening Brief and requires no reply. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Officer Stroud lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to 
detain Appellant for a warrants check. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
(Reply to Appellee's Point I) 
It is well established that the scope and duration of any 
seizure "must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances 
which rendered its initiation permissible" [citations omitted]. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). Detaining Ms. Johnson to run 
a warrants check exceeded the scope of any permissible detention in 
this case. See generally State v. Damm, Kan. Sup.Ct. No. 62,897 
(March 3, 1990), 46 Cr.L. 1509 (impermissible to detain driver while 
running warrants check on passengers). 
The State attempts to justify the detention by focusing on 
the safety rationale set forth in Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 434 U.S. 
106 (1977). Appellee's Brief at 8, 12. Such a safety rationale is 
inapplicable to the present case since there is no indication that 
either Appellant or the driver did anything to cause the officer to 
be concerned for his safety. The officer did not ask Ms. Johnson to 
get out of the car nor did he search her for weapons. Instead, he 
asked her for identification, then detained her while running a 
warrants check. The officer's actions did nothing to protect his 
safety in this case. Therefore, the issue of whether the Mimms 
holding regarding a driver should be extended to a passenger where 
there are no specific facts indicating the passenger is armed is not 
relevant to this case. 
All of the cases cited by the State for the proposition 
that "[o]ther courts have extended the Mimms ruling to allow a 
police officer to detain passengers in a routine traffic stop by 
also ordering the passengers out of the vehicle" (Appellee's Brief 
at 8) are therefore not pertinent since the officer testified that 
he did not order Ms. Johnson out of the vehicle and he did not 
search her for weapons. 
The cases cited by the State on page 8 of its brief in 
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support of the propositiion set forth above are distinguishable as 
follows. In People v. Branch, 134 Misc. 2d 705, 512 N.Y.S.2d 642 
(Sup.Ct. 1987), the New York Supreme Court held that an officer 
could order a passenger who was making furtive movements out of a 
vehicle stopped for a traffic matter and frisk him for weapons where 
both the driver and another passenger who had run from the vehicle 
were carrying guns. The Branch Court acknowledged that "one cannot 
be stopped or arrested for merely being in the company of another" 
(citations omitted). Branch at 643. The Court made a distinction 
between the ability of an officer to order a passenger out of a 
vehicle for safety reasons and the constitutional ability to 
thereafter frisk that person. Id. Based on the facts of that case 
and a safety rationale, the Court upheld the frisk. 
In People v. Livicrni, 88 A.D.2d 386, 453 N.Y.S.2d 708 
(1982), aff d, 58 N.Y.2d 894, 460 N.Y.S.2d 530, 447 N.E.2d 1324 
(1981), the court addressed the "narrow question" of whether a 
police officer can "order a passenger out of the vehicle at gunpoint 
because of the officer's observation of an empty gun holster in 
plain view in the passenger compartment of the vehicle." Livigni at 
708. As was the case in Branch, the decision that such action was 
permissible was based on a safety rationale and specific facts 
indicating the passenger might be armed, neither of which is present 
in the instant case. 
Similarly, in People v. David L., 56 N.Y.2d 698, 451 
N.Y.S.2d 722, 436 N.E.2d 1324 (1981), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 866 
(1982), a gun in the waist band of the passenger was visible to the 
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officer, as the passenger moved along the seat.1 
In the instant case, where the officer's actions indicated 
he was not concerned about weapons and where no specific facts 
linked Ms. Johnson to criminal activity (or even suggested that the 
driver was involved in anything other than traffic violations), the 
cases cited by the State in support of an extension of the Mimms 
rationale are inapplicable. 
The State asks this Court to give deference to the trial 
court findings, then quotes a portion of the court's ruling. 
Appellee's Brief at 9. For clarification, Appellant includes the 
entire ruling as Addendum A. The portion of the court's ruling 
quoted by the State contains at least three findings that 
demonstrate that the ruling should not be relied upon by this Court 
in reaching its decision. 
First, as set forth more fully in footnote 5 on page 11 of 
Appellant's opening brief, the officer was not aware that the 
driver's license was suspended when he detained Appellant (T. 6, 7, 
15). Therefore, the trial court's finding that the suspended 
license supported the reasonableness of the detention should not be 
given deference, nor should the erroneous reliance on that finding 
by the Court of Appeals be given weight. See State v. Johnson. 771 
P.2d 326, 329 (Utah App. 1989). 
1
 The narrow question addressed in David L. was whether 
the officer could open the door "during the course of an 
investigation" following a traffic stop. People v. David L., 439 
N.Y.S.2d 152, 154, 81 A.D.2d 893 (1981). 
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Second, the trial court's statement that "there is no 
indication of who the owner of the car was" (T. 46) is not supported 
by the record. The officer never asked the driver or Ms. Johnson 
who the owner was or how the driver came to be in possession of the 
car. 
Finally, in the last paragraph of the ruling quoted by the 
State on page 9 of its brief, the Court stated: 
I think the officer had a legitimate reason to 
ask the passenger as to her identity to determine 
the identity of the driver, because the vehicle's 
registration was not present, and the owner was not 
known, and I think the officer was exercising a 
legitimate concern in regards to the ownership of 
the vehicle and to whether the vehicle may have 
possibly been either stolen or being driven without 
possibly the owner's consent. 
(T. 46-7) (emphasis added). This paragraph suggests that the trial 
court confused the issue of whether it was proper to ask the 
passenger her name in an attempt to ascertain whether the passenger 
was the owner with the issue of whether it was proper to detain the 
passenger for a warrants check. 
In its argument, the State focuses on the propriety of 
temporarily detaining a passenger where the State has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the passenger is armed and dangerous, or 
to ascertain whether the driver has the owner's permission to drive 
the vehicle or to ascertain whether the passenger is licensed to 
drive. Appellee's brief at 12-13. 
The State ignores the fact, however, that (1) the officer 
did not investigate whether the vehicle was stolen, but instead ran 
a warrants check; (2) the officer did not have a reasonable, 
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articulable suspicion Appellant was armed; and (3) the officer was 
not investigating whether Appellant was licensed to drive* 
The State cites United States v. Harris, 528 F.2d 1327 
(1975), for the proposition that an officer may "request that a 
passenger remain seated while investigating a routine traffic stop" 
in order to "solicit the passenger's aid in identifying the driver 
and owner of the vehicle in determining whether the driver has the 
owner's permission to operate the vehicle." Appellee's Brief at 
12. In Harris, an officer stopped a vehicle which illegally 
displayed both a current Missouri license plate cind an in-transit 
sticker. After stopping the vehicle, the officer observed scratches 
and scrapes around the rivets which bolted the vehicle 
identification number (VIN) to the dash. Because the VIN appeared 
to have been tampered with, the officer checked with the National 
Crime Information Center (NCIC) and ascertained that the vehicle was 
in fact stolen.2 
Harris is distinguishable from the present case since the 
number identifying the vehicle appeared to be tampered with, giving 
rise to a suspicion that the vehicle had been stolen. In addition, 
the officer did not exceed the scope of any reasonable detention 
2
 As the Court noted in footnote 1, 528 F.2d at 1327: 
The National Crime Information Center (N.C.I.C.) is 
a department within the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation which records on computer the vehicle 
identification numbers of stolen vehicles for law 
enforcement purposes. Safety patrol officers are 
able to complete such a check by radio in a matter 
of minutes. 
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since he immediately pursued the possibility that the vehicle was 
stolen rather than detaining passengers to run a warrants check. 
The State cites State v. Davis, 452 So.2d 1208, 1212 (La. 
App. 1984) for the proposition that officers may detain a passenger 
"to question the passenger whether he or she is licensed to drive in 
the event that the driver is unable or unlicensed to drive the 
vehicle from the scene of the stop." Appellee's brief at 12-13. In 
Davis, the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle he claimed was 
owned by his wife. The officers ran a check on the driver and 
thereafter placed the driver under arrest as the result of 
information obtained in the check. 
According to the officers, Davis was moving "uneasily" in 
the passenger seat and officers ordered him out of the vehicle for 
safety purposes; after Davis exited the vehicle, officers noticed a 
bulge which they believed might be a weapon. Officers therefore 
searched Mr. Davis and located a gun.3 The Court discussed the 
application of the Mimms safety rationale to a passenger and 
determined that it was appropriate under the circumstances of the 
case. Although the court did note that the passenger could not 
produce a driver's license or identification which would permit 
3
 The defendant presented a different version of what 
occurred. According to the defendant, the officers ordered him out 
of the vehicle and placed him under arrest for not having adequate 
identification. The officers then searched the vehicle and located 
the gun. The appellate court upheld the search under either version 
of the facts; it relied on New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 
S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), for its determination that a 
search of the vehicle was proper after a lawful custodial arrest. 
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officers to let him drive away, it based its decision on the 
totality of the circumstances. 
The facts of the instant case are quite different from 
those in Davis. The passenger did not claim to be the wife of the 
owner of the vehicle and in fact made no claims to the vehicle. The 
safety rationale in Mimms was inapplicable, and, at the time the 
officer decided to detain Ms. Johnson for a warrants check, he did 
not know that the driver was not properly licensed and would 
therefore be unable to drive the car. 
The State relies on Mallarino v. State, 379 S.E.2d 210, 213 
(Ga. 1989) for the proposition that "where a routine traffic stop 
has escalated into something more based upon a reasonable suspicion 
that criminal activity is afoot, a police officer may detain the 
vehicle occupants for further investigation" (Appellee's brief at 
13) and that under the circumstances of the case, "it was reasonable 
for Stroud to continue to detain the driver and defendant to 
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 
information." Appellee's brief at 11. In Mallarino, the appellant 
was the driver of the vehicle, not the passenger, and the issues 
raised by the appellant that the stop of the vehicle was pretextual 
and that his consent to search the vehicle was not voluntary were 
discussed in that context. The Court did not directly address the 
limits placed on the detention of a passenger. The Mallarino Court 
reiterated the well established rule: 
In assessing the reasonableness of the length of 
detention, it is appropriate to examine "whether the 
police diligently pursued a means of investigation 
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that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it was 
necessary to detain the defendant." (Citations 
omitted.) 
Mallarino, 379 S.E.2d at 213. 
In the present case, the officer did not diligently pursue 
an investigation that would confirm or dispel his hunch that the 
vehicle might have been stolen. Under the circumstances of this 
case, the officer violated the fourth amendment by detaining 
Ms. Johnson for a warrants check. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, KAREN MARIE JOHNSON, by and through counsel, 
JOAN C. WATT, respectfully requests that this Court reverse her 
conviction and remand the case for a new trial absent the illegally 
seized evidence. 
SUBMITTED this I day of May, 1990. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 23 6 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this r day of May, 1990. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by this day 
of May, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 officer or the defendant, the sequence of events that 
2 took place are a little bit different in regards to when 
3 the stop was made, what took place,as to whether she was 
4 asked to wait there or she was told, "I will be right 
5 back," and whether implicit in his saying, "I will be 
6 right back," that that could be interpreted to mean, "You 
7 have to wait until I get back." 
8 The way she indicated was that, "You wait 
9 here and," you know, "I am going to run a check," after 
10 he got the name, first of the driver, then of the passenger. 
11 Whether she got out of the car when she gave the name, 
12 and I believe he also asked for the birth date, wasn't 
13 it, at that same time? 
14 MS. LOY: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: Or whether she got out of the 
15 car and went to the officer's car and at that time she 
17 gave him the name and birth date. Based on what the Court 
18 has heard, the Court is of the opinion that the motion 
19 to suppress should be denied. The Court is of the opinion 
20 that based on the evidence that has been given, and taking 
21 into consideration both the officer and the defendant 
22 were under oath and gave slightly different versions of 
23 exactly what happened, that the officer's testimony in 
24 regards to the stopping being based on a violation of 
25 the law and the driver not having produced the, I believe 
46 
1 it was the driver's license that was valid at the time, 
2 plus having no registration, there was no indication of 
3 who the owner of the car was, and the officer had some 
4 question in regards to whether the car may possibly have 
5 been stolen, although the testimony that was given was 
6 that the — there was no recent notice that there was 
7 a stolen vehicle and particularly of this vehicle itself. 
8 There was no registration in the vehicle, 
9 and the driver herself was not the owner. 
10 I think the officer had a legitimate reason 
11 to ask the passenger as to her identity to determine the 
12 identity ofthe driver, because the vehicle's registration 
13 was not present, and the owner was not known, and I think 
14 the officer was exercising a legitimate concern in regards 
15 to the ownership of the vehicle and to whether the vehicle 
16 may have possibly been either stolen or being driven without 
17 possibly the owner's consent. And that upon making inquiry, 
18 there is some dispute as to where the inquiry was made, 
19 whether the parties were required to remain there and 
20 whether there was in fact a detention at the time, and 
21 whether the detention may have been longer than permissible 
22 under the cases that were provided by Miss Loy. 
23 There is some cases that she has cited that 
24 the Court had some question on in regards to whether she 
25 was right and that initial stop was made for a traffic 
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1 violation, and all the matters in regards to the traffic 
2 violation were already pursued, and anything further would 
3 be legal, and detention would be legal, and the length 
4 of time was longer than what normally would be called 
5 a temporary stop to make inquiry. 
6 There is some controversy as to whether it 
7 was 15 minutes or less than that. But it appears to the 
8 Court it was a reasonable period of time that evolved 
9 and transpired in regards to this particular stop here. 
10 Based on the officer's inquiry and finding 
11 out that there was a warrant out for the defendant, he 
12 made a legal arrest and incident to that arrest he made 
13 inquiry regarding the backpack that she was carrying. 
14 And she initially indicated it was not hers and later 
15 on apparently her name was on there and was identified, 
16 and she admitted it was hers. I think the officer had 
17 a legitimate right and a legal right to make inquiry into 
18 the contents of the pack, being that first there was a 
19 denial, some question as to the ownership, if in fact 
20 the sequence is that she denied the ownership and later 
21 on made an admission, there's some question in the officer's 
22 mind as to actually the ownership of the bag at the time, 
23 that he decided that he was going to make inquiry into 
24 the contents of the bag, and I think it's incident to 
25 a valid arrest that he did make that inquiry. 
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1 This may be one of those cases you may have 
2 to take up, because I think there's no cases on point 
3 that either of you have brought up, and it's really very 
4 close. But based on the circumstances, the Court is of 
5 the opinion that there was a valid arrest, there was a 
6 valid stop, and that there was valid seizure. 
7 MS. LOY: Your Honor, with that ruling in 
8 mind, when would you like me to appear with my client 
9 for pretrial? Should we do that on Monday or next Friday? 
10 THE COURT: Looks like we will not be able 
11 to go on this case as scheduled because I am not sure 
12 how long this other case is going to — 
13 THE CLERK: How about next Friday at 9:00? 
14 THE COURT: Next Friday at 9:00. 
15 MR. JONES: Can't we set it now? We have 
16 the attorneys. Do you need your client? 
17 MS. LOY: I am concerned today that she's 
18 not here today that we1re not — 
19 MR. JONES: Why don't we set a date and if 
20 that causes problems, we can get back to it. 
21 MS. LOY: That's fine with us. She's out 
22 of custody and, frankly, it's going to take me until toward 
23 the end of March to be rid of these Nixon cases. So there 
24 are not too many dates between now and then. 
25 THE COURT: What date? 
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